

CUBA

The President has made it repeatedly clear that we will not be satisfied until the Cuban people have been assured the opportunity of freely choosing their own government, which can be reunited with the rest of the Hemisphere and which is not the captive of any external political or economic system or military presence.

Under the Rio Treaty, we are working to create an atmosphere which is consistent with this objective, and which has at least five principal features.

(1) First is military pressure, short of an act of war, to safeguard the security of the Hemisphere -- to prevent aggressive acts or threats from Cuba -- to keep the island under constant surveillance and enforce that surveillance if necessary -- to make certain it has no significant offensive capability -- to prevent any attack on any Latin American nation -- to prevent Cuba from exporting either aggression or the means of aggression -- to assure safety of the air lanes and sea lanes in that area -- and to back up our pledge that, in the event of any internal insurrection, there will not be another "Hungary" in Cuba.

(2) Reduce Cuban Subversion of Hemisphere -- work through the OAS and with individual nations to restrict the flow of insurrectionary agents, guerrillas, students, arms, funds and literature from Cuba and Cuban embassies -- assist free governments with police and internal security problems.

(3) Weaken Cuba economically -- Restrict Cuban trade and shipping -- make more difficult the replacement of machinery, the purchase of consumer essentials and access to world markets for sugar and other Cuban products. (Total Cuban trade with the Atlantic community and Latin America fell from \$800 million in 1960 to \$90 million in 1962; the number of free world ships calling at Cuban ports, on their own or under Bloc charter, declined from 128 in January, 1962 to 12 in January, 1963) -- restrict air transportation and communication links to the island -- maximize its cost to the Soviet economy, currently estimated to be at least \$1 million a day. The year 1963 will undoubtedly be the worst year economically that Cuba will have known in recent times.

(4) Undermine Castro politically -- Isolate him from the rest of the hemisphere -- make clear hemisphere condemns his external control, his duplicity and his betrayal of Cuban revolution (Punta del Este, OAS October Resolution, 14 out of 19 Latin American countries have broken diplomatic relations) -- diminish his prestige -- make Cuban people (and other Latin

Americans) aware of Soviet domination, Castro tyranny, economic mismanagement, hemisphere s condemnation -- (VOA Spanish broadcasts, 1 hour a day in 1960, 9 hours a day now; distributed 3 million copies of anti-Castro books) -- prepare exile leaders for truly free Cuba.

(5) Build the Alliance for Progress -- work with other nations to build an economic and political climate in which communism is out of place and Castroism cannot spread.

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

U. S. Policy toward Cuba today

Objective: To work under the Rio Treaty to create an atmosphere in which the Castro regime will be replaced by a free Cuban government, which can be reunited with the rest of the Hemisphere and which is not the captive of any external political or economic system or military presence. (3)

Principal Overt Means:

- (C) 1. Prevent aggressive acts or threats from Cuba -- Keep the island under constant surveillance -- make certain it has no significant offensive capability -- prevent any attack on any Latin American nation -- safeguard security of U. S. and Hemisphere.
2. Reduce Cuban Subversion of Hemisphere -- work through the OAS and with individual nations to restrict the flow of insurrectionary agents, guerrillas, students, arms, funds and literature from Cuba and Cuban embassies -- assist free governments with police and internal security problems.
3. Weaken Cuba economically -- Restrict Cuban trade and shipping -- make more difficult the replacement of machinery, the purchase of consumer essentials and access to world markets for sugar and other Cuban products (Total Cuban trade with the Atlantic community and Latin America fell from \$800 million in 1960 to \$90 million in 1962; the number of free world ships calling at Cuban ports, on their own or under Bloc charter, declined from 128 in January, 1962 to 12 in January, 1963) -- restrict air transportation and communication links to the island -- maximize its cost to the Soviet economy, (F) → actually estimated to be about 0.1 million a day
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5. Build the Alliance for Progress -- work with other nations to build an economic and political climate in which communism is out of place and Castroism cannot spread.